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Abstract
A surprising cross country stylized fact is that there is little pos-
itive correlation between growth and public spending on education.
The empirical relationship suggests that a higher public spending on
education tends to lower the long run per capita growth rate and
schooling returns. This goes contrary to the conventional wisdom
that education is a major driver of growth. In this paper, we revisit
this issue and try to understand these puzzling facts in terms of an en-
dogenous growth model. Our cross country calibration of the growth
model predicts that countries with greater government involvement in
education experience lower schooling e¤orts and lower growth.
1 Introduction
The e¤ect of public expenditure on educational attainment and growth is
an unresolved issue. A recent ow of literature questions the e¤ect of gov-
Without implicating the rst author gratefully acknowledges very insightful comments
by B. Ravikumar on an earlier draft of this paper. The rst author also gratefully ac-
knowledges a research leave from Durham University to complete this project.
1
ernment involvement in education on the educational attainment of pupils.
Based on US and international data Hanushek (2003) persuasively argues
that a resource based policy of the government has little e¤ects on pupils
educational attainment. In majority of the cases, the active involvement of
the government in the education sector is deemed to be a failure. Blankenau
and Camera (2009) show that in a strategic environment when a government
spends more on education sector, students may underinvest in e¤orts. If
the government involvement in education has such a questionable e¤ect on
pupilseducational attainment, the spillover e¤ect of this on economic growth
also becomes debatable.1
The objective of this paper is to ask specically in the context of an
endogenously growing economy why a resource based public education pol-
icy can be counterproductive. There is a growing literature that explores
the link between public expenditure on education and growth (Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1992, 1997, 1998). Our paper is closely related to Blankenau
and Simpson (2004) and Blankenau et al. (2007) who address the relation-
ship between growth and public education spending. Our model, however,
di¤ers from both these papers in several important ways. First, besides us-
ing a bigger sample of countries than Blankenau et al. (2007), we focus on
households time allocation between schooling and work as an important de-
terminant of long run growth and public education spending. Blankenau
et al. (2007), on the other hand, do not model time allocation to schooling.
Second, unlike Blankenau and Simpson (2004) and Blankenau et al.(2007),
we focus on the proactive role of the government as a factor determining the
public education spending behavior. Third, we also analyze the relationship
between public education spending and schooling returns while Blankenau
and Simpson (2004) and Blankenau et al.(2007) do not explore any such re-
lationship. Finally, Blankenau et al. use an overlapping generations model
1Pritchett (2001) shows signicant skepticism about the positive e¤ect of education
spending on growth. Sylwester (2000) demonstrates that the contemporaneous education
expenditure has a negative e¤ect on growth. Temple (2001) revisits the empirical evidence
and shows with alternative statistical procedures that the link between education expen-
diture and growth is tenuous. Blankenau et al. (2007) argue that government spending
on education has insignicant e¤ect on growth for low and middle income countries while
it has a positive e¤ect on rich countries.
2
while we use an innite horizon model making the model more naturally
amenable to calibration using the cross country data.
The principal insight from our endogenous growth model is that when the
government spends more on teachers and pupils, two opposing e¤ects are at
work. First is a positive complementarity e¤ect because of the government
provision of intermediate inputs in the form of teacher salary and other school
aids. Second, there is a negative distortionary e¤ect due to the tax on the
non-education sector (goods sector) to nance education spending. The
latter discourages physical capital investment and it lowers the capital stock
in the goods sector. Due to diminishing returns, the return on physical
capital thus rises. Households respond to this by reallocating more time to
the goods sector and less time to schooling to rebalance the return on physical
capital and human capital. This crowding out e¤ect on schooling time is the
key factor that lowers the long run growth rate in the economy. The relative
strengths of these two opposing forces depends critically on the proactive role
of the government in the education sector which we call government bias in
education.
Our approach is novel because we highlight the role of government bias
in education as a central determinant of the cross country relationship be-
tween growth and public spending on education. This government bias is an
institutional feature which has so far been overlooked in the literarture. We
formulate this government bias in terms of a simple neoclassical schooling
technology where public spending appears as an intermediate input together
with private schooling e¤orts in education for creation of human capital. The
relative importance of public and private inputs in the production of human
capital is treated as a technology parameter, which we characterize as the
government bias in education. Our central question is then to understand
how this government bias in education inuences public education spending
propensity, pupils incentive to learn, schooling returns and ultimately the
economic growth of a nation.
Using our calibrated growth model, we estimate this government bias for
a wide range of countries. Our model predicts that countries with a greater
government bias in education experience a greater public education share
in GDP, lower private schooling e¤ort and a lower long run growth. Thus
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even though there is a technological complementarity between private and
public inputs in the human capital production, a greater government bias
in the education sector crowds out private schooling e¤orts for majority of
countries in our sample.
Our model also provides lessons for optimal public spending policy in
education. A benevolent government that aims to promote societal wel-
fare should spend more on education in an economy where the government
involvement in education is already present in terms of a rich public edu-
cational infrastructure. Thus contrary to conventional wisdom, a blanket
increase in government spending on education may not necessarily promote
growth and welfare in all countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section presents some
key development facts to motivate our growth model. Section 3 lays out an
endogenous growth model and characterizes the balanced growth properties
of model variables. Section 4 reports the quantitative implications of the
model based on cross country calibration. Section 5 discusses welfare and
policy implications. Section 6 concludes. Construction of data and details
on derivation of equilibrium conditions and solution procedure of the model
are given in the Appendix.
2 Some Development Facts
Figure 1 plots the average per capita growth rate (1970-2005) against the
public education spending ratio for 166 countries. Given the well known
cross country volatility of growth rate, a negative relationship holds. The
correlation coe¢ cient is -0.15 which is statistically signicant at the 5% level.
A clearer relationship emerges if countries are broadly grouped. Figure
2 plots the cross country per capita growth rate and education spending
ratio averaged over the period 1970-2005 for 18 groups of countries sorted
by per capita income. The correlation coe¢ cient is -0.38. Higher spending
ratio generally lowers growth except for countries at the very top education
spending ratio. At this very top end, a higher spending ratio tends to raise
the per capita growth. The relationship between education spending ratio
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resembles nonlinearity as pointed out by Blankenau et al. (2007).
Figure 3 plots the rate of return on education against the education spend-
ing ratio for 48 countries for which the rate of return data are available.2 The
correlation coe¢ cient is -0.15 and statistically signcant at the 5% level.
The essence of these cross country stylized facts can be summarized as
follows. Growth rate and return on education are lower in countries where
the government spends more on education. The following section presents a
growth model to understand these stylized facts.
3 The Model
The model is an adaptation of the Lucas-Uzawa (Lucas, 1988) model. There
are two sectors, goods and education. A xed time (normalized at unity) is
allocated between schooling and goods production. Time lHt allocated to
schooling at date t creates e¤ective labour or human capital (ht+1) in the
following period. The productivity of schooling e¤ort which is the same as
the quality of schooling depends on pupilslearning ability parameter (AH)
which is assumed to be a country-specic parameter, and the public spending
on education (gt):
The schooling technology thus follows the Cobb-Douglas form as in Glomm
and Ravikumar (1997) and Blankenau et al. (2007):
ht+1 = (1  h)ht + AHgt (lHtht)1  (1)
The schooling technology (1) is actually a production function for new hu-
man capital. In a similar vein as in Barro (1990), the inputs in the pro-
duction function are public spending one education gt and private spending
lHtht: The latter is the imputed (opportunity) cost of diverting time from
goods production to human capital production.3
The schooling technology parameter  is of central interest in this paper.
2Details of all the data sources are discussed in the appendix.
3If an explicit labour market is in place, this opportunity cost will be measured by the
foregone wages due to spending time at school.
5
 is simply the elasticity of the ow of knowledge with respect to government
spending on intermediate input to human capital production (e.g. teachers).
For example, a one percent increase in teachers salary creates a higher per-
cent increase in pupilsattainment in an economy with a better educational
infrastructure (e.g. school library, internet facility). Viewed from this per-
spective,  can be interpreted as the infrastructural role of the government
in the education sector. In other words,  is higher in countries where the
government had already taken a proactive role in the past by investing a
lot of resources to build such a rich infrastructure. Rather than explicitly
modelling the governments infrastructural investment in education, we treat
this infrastructural role of the government as a country-specic technology
parameter. Absent such a government role in the education ( equals zero),
the schooling technology reverts to the Lucas (1988) form. Given this inter-
pretation, hereafter we label the schooling technology parameter () as the
government bias in the education sector. We nd that this government bias
parameter is quite fundamental in determining the cross-country relationship
between public spending on education and growth.
Final goods (yt) are produced with the help of human and physical capital
via the Cobb-Douglas production technology:
yt = AGkt
(lGtht)
1  (2)
where lGt ( that equals 1   lHt) is the remaining time allocated to the pro-
duction of goods and AG is a constant total factor productivity (TFP) in the
goods sector.4
The investment goods technology is specied as follows:
kt+1 = (1  k)kt + ikt (3)
where k is a xed rate of depreciation of physical capital.
The government nances the education spending (gt) by levying a propor-
tional tax ( t) on goods sector output, yt . In other words, the government
budget constraint is:
4We assume that leisure time is xed.
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gt =  tyt (4)
The representative household takes the sequence of tax rates f t} as given
and chooses the sequences fctg; fitg; flHtg; that maximize
Max
1X
t=0
t ln(ct)
subject to the resource constraint:
ct + it = (1   t)yt (5)
and the schooling technology (1).
Given that the private sector behaves optimally, the government sets the
tax rates f tg to maximize societal welfare.
3.1 Balanced Growth Properties
Since the central goal of the paper is to understand the role of public spending
in education in determining the dispersion in cross country long run growth
rates, we assume that each country has already embarked on a balanced
growth path. We thus focus on the balanced growth property of our proposed
economy. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Along the balanced growth path, the optimal share of public
spending in GDP is given by:
 =
1 
1  :
lH
lG
1 + 1 
1  :
lH
lG
(6)
Proof. Appendix.
Along the balanced growth path, the time allocations to goods and
schooling sectors are stationary which we denote as lH and lG dropping the
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time subscripts. The ratios of output to capital (yt=kt) and the physical to
human capital (kt=ht) are also constants. Proposition 1 establishes that the
share of education in GDP is also constant. In other words, the steady state
government spending share in GDP is given by:
gt
yt
=  (7)
Dene the gross balanced growth rate as : There are three key balanced
growth equations. Based on the rst order condition for the physical capital
stock we get:
 =  [(1  )(yt=kt) + 1  k] (8)
Based on the rst order condition for the human capital stock, one gets:
 = [1  h + AH(1  ) l H (yt=ht)] (9)
Finally, using the human capital technology (1), we get a third balanced
growth equation:
 = 1  h + AH l1 H AGl(1 )G (kt=ht) (10)
Given the production function (2), these three equations solve for three
unknowns, namely k=h, lH and : The appendix provides the details of the
derivation.
3.2 Implications for Return to Schooling
The model establishes a tight link between private schooling e¤orts, growth
rates and returns to schooling. Along the balanced growth path, the return
to human capital
 
Rh

is given by:
Rh = 1  h +MPHE (11)
The private agents allocate time between goods production and schooling
to equate the marginal returns to physical and human capital. In other
words, we have the fundamental arbitrage condition that the return on human
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capital must balance the after tax return on physical capital.:
Rh = (1  )(y=k) + 1  k (12)
The appendix shows the details of the derivation of (11) and (12).
4 Cross country calibration of government bias
in education
In this section, we report the results of a cross country calibration experiment.
Our basic premise is that all countries share the same structural parameters
except the government bias parameter  and the level of cognitive skill, AH .
This premise is based on the evidence that the education spending ratio
di¤ers a lot across countries (see Fig 1). The di¤erence in learning ability
across countries is also well documented by Hanushek and Woessman (2008).
Other structural parameters are xed at some baseline levels. The capital
share parameter  and the rate of depreciation of physical capital, k are xed
at the conventional levels 0.36 and 0.1 (Prescott, 1986). The remaining
parameters are xed at  = 0:94; AG = 3:9 and h = :05 with a goal to
arrive at reasonable cross-country steady state distribution for average time
allocation between work and schooling (lH), the average level of cognitive
skill, AH and the average government bias in the education . Table 1
summarizes the baseline parameter values.
Table 1: Baseline estimates of structural parameters common to all countries
  k h AG
0.36 0.94 0.1 0.05 3.9
In order to get cross country estimates of the two crucial educational
technology parameters,  and AH , we follow a method of reverse engineering:
We focus on 4 key steady state equations, (6), (8), (9) and (10). We x
9
; ;AG; k; H at the baseline levels. We assume that all 166 countries in
our sample have embarked on various steady states. This means that for
each country  and  are equal to the historical average growth rate of GDP
and education share in GDP. Given that all countries share the same baseline
estimates of the structural parameters as shown in Table 1, it means that
for each country in our sample, we have four equations in four unknowns,
namely ; AH ; lH and k=y: These four unknowns can be thus backed out
from the model. Doing so we make our growth model perfectly match the
cross country growth rates and education shares. We then back out the
two crucial education technology parameters, ; AH as well as the time to
schooling lH and the capital-output ratio (k=y) for each of the countries in
our sample.5
Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviation of the cross country
distribution of the four key steady state variables. The average time to
schooling lH is 0.47 which is similar to the estimate of Gomme and Rupert
(2007). A cross country average AH of 0:15 is in the vicinity of the value
calibrated by Basu et al. (2010) and an average  = 0:07 is close to the cross
country average share of public spending on education in GDP (which is 0.05)
for our sample. The cross country average capital:output ratio of 1.91 is in
line with the estimate of capital:output ratio for the US based on a Solow
growth model (Mankiw, 2003). The cross country dispersion is highest for
the capital-output ratio which is not surprising given the enormous disparity
in the per capita output across countries.
5Although some cross country data are available for time to schooling (e.g. Barro and
Lee, 1994), we use our model to generate cross country estimates of lH : The reason is that
the variable lH in our model more accurately represents schooling e¤orts which cannot be
fully reected by the cross-country data on schooling time. For example, parents might
spend a signicant amount of time in tutoring their children which means a lot of schooling
e¤orts. It is hard to nd cross country data for this kind of e¤orts. In a similar vein,
Blankenau and Camera (2009) argue that schooling attendance may be the same across
countries but e¤orts may di¤er. We also rely on the model to generate cross country
series for capital/output ratio (k=y) and pupils learning ability AH because reliable cross-
country series for capital stock are hard to get. About learning ability, the closest series
available are Hanushek and Weissman (2006). These estimates are, however, based on
standardized test scores which are the end results of learning ability and even debatable
proxy for learning ability.
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Table 2: Cross country steady state distribution of the education technology
lH AH  k=y
Mean 0.47 0.15 0.07 1.91
Std Deviation 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21
Table 3 reports the summary description of  for broad groups of countries
classied in regions. The range of regional variation of  is from 0.036 to
0.096 which is substantial. The government bias is the highest in the North
American region where Canada provides the lead (0.12). Next to North
America are OECD countries. The government bias is the lowest in the
South Asian region. The bottom row of the table reports the historical
average growth rate of GDP for each region. A sharp negative regional
relationship emerges between the government bias in education and the long
run average growth rates. (see Figure 4).
Table 3: Regional Features of the Government Bias in Education
Asia Europe
Latin America and
Caribbean
Middle East
and North Africa
OECD
North
America
South
Asia
Africa
 0.057 0.078 0.068 0.063 0.08 0.096 0.036 0.077
g(%) 2.830 2.111 1.478 1.518 2.259 1.756 3.811 0.731
Table 4 summarizes the cross correlations of the key macroeconomic vari-
ables of interest based on our calibrated growth model for the full sample of
166 countries. The correlation between growth and government bias is -0.46
which further conrms the negative relation reported in Figure 4. Since
schooling return is proportional to growth rate (see equation (A.13)) and
growth rate negatively varies with , the immediate implication is that re-
turns to schooling also covary negatively with . The model thus reects the
stylized facts reported in section 2 that there is a negative cross country cor-
relation between growth rate and spending ratio as well as schooling return
and spending ratio.
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Table 4: Cross country correlations of the key macroeconomic varaibles
lH AH  k=y   R
h
lH 1
AH 0.92 1
 -0.64 -0.39 1
k=y -0.94 -0.96 0.35 1
 -0.14 0.12 0.81 -0.19 1
 0.93 0.99 -0.46 -0.95 0.01 1
Rh 0.93 0.99 -0.46 -0.95 0.01 1 1
4.1 Government bias in education and schooling ef-
forts
The cross country correlation between  and lH is -0.64 that is found to be
signicant at the 5% level. Figure 4 plots lH against  for all 166 countries in
the sample. The scatter plot also conrms the strong negative relationship
between  and lH . Countries with a greater government bias in education
experience crowding out of private schooling e¤orts.
Not surprisingly, the model predicts that the cross country correlation
between the education share  and government bias,  is strongly positive
(correlation coe¢ cient is 0.84). Figure 5 plots the government bias in the
education sector against the education share. Governments in countries with
a greater government bias in education spend more on education as a fraction
of GDP.
These two cross-country plots shed light on the nding of Hanushek (2003)
that greater public resources in education does not help promote pupils
learning incentive. In fact, a greater government involvement in education
crowds out private schooling e¤orts. Although this crowding out e¤ect is
apparently counterintuitive, a closer examination reveals that a fundamental
arbitrage condition (12) is at work in explaining this. Everything else equal,
an increase in  raises the optimal tax rate  to nance education spending.
Since the goods sector is more capital intensive than the education sector, this
increase in tax lowers the ratio of physical to human capital in the economy
which raises the marginal product of physical capital. If agents can alter the
12
time allocation, they will allocate more time to work and less to schooling to
preserve the arbitrage condition (12).
For 100% depreciation of human capital (h = 1), an analytical expression
for lH exists and it conrms this intuition. Use (A.13) and (10) to get:
lH = (1  ) (13)
which upon substitution in (6) yields
 =
(1  )
(1  ) 1 +  + (1  ) (14)
It is straightforward to verify from (13) and (14) that countries with a
greater government bias in education (higher ) experience a crowding out
of private schooling e¤orts and also a greater share of GDP in education.
5 Welfare Implications
Does an increase in public spending on education necessarily make the society
worse o¤in the long run? In the appendix, we have shown that the education
spending share  that maximizes growth also maximizes societal welfare.
Thus any cross country variation of  that lowers growth rate would also
lower societal welfare. Growth can be thus a su¢ cient statistic of a measure
of countrys welfare in our representative agent growth model.
Given this connection between growth and welfare, the rst question that
we ask is: Do countries with a greater government bias in education () nec-
essarily experience lower welfare? Our calibrated model based on cross
country evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. A higher  lowers
long run per capita growth rate of a country and thus lowers welfare. One
has to be careful though to generalize this result. An increase in  has two
opposing e¤ects on growth, (i) crowding out e¤ect on schooling e¤ort, (ii)
complementarity e¤ect. The former lowers growth while the latter promotes
growth. In our cross country calibration, we nd that (i) is stronger than (ii).
However, if one allows a large variation of , it is possible that for countries
with a very high , greater government involvement might be benecial for
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growth. Figure 10 plots growth against education share when  is allowed to
vary from 0.05 to 0.4. The relationship is U shaped. For very high educa-
tion spenders, an increase in government involvement may be benecial for
growth. This nonlinear relationship between growth and education spending
is also consistent with Blankenau and Simpson (2007) who nd that higher
education spending promotes growth particularly in rich countries.
6 Conclusion
The e¤ect of public education spending on growth is an empirically unsettled
issue. A plethora of studies document that public education spending does
not help promote growth. Our cross country stylized facts also support this
nding. Growth and schooling returns are in fact lower in countries with
a higher ratio of public spending to GDP except for very high education
spenders. In this paper, we reopen this issue and investigate this within
an endogenous growth framework. Public spending on education appears
directly in the human capital technology. The relative intensity of public
and private education spending, which we call government bias in education,
appears to be a fundamental determinant of cross country dispersion in long
run growth and schooling returns. A higher government bias has conicting
e¤ects on growth. On the one hand, it lowers growth by crowding out private
schooling e¤orts. On the other hand, it promotes growth through the com-
plementarity channel. The latter e¤ect is stronger in countries which have
historically a greater government bias in education. Based on our growth
model, we estimate this government bias parameter for a wide range of coun-
tries and nd that the government bias in education is generally higher in
rich countries.
The policy implications of our analysis is that an increase in public spend-
ing on education without an adequate infrastructural support may not neces-
sarily be benecial for the society. Currently 80 percent of education spend-
ing goes to teacher salaries6 which is likely to be spent more on consumption
than in investment. For the complementarity e¤ect of public spending to
6Based on UNECSCO database on education available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/.
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dominate, a nation may need a greater educational infrastructure. This in-
frastructural role of the government in education is an area worth exploring
in future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
Database for PPP adjusted per capita income and education spending ratios
were taken from the World Development Indicators
(available at http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/).
Our sample period generally ranges from 1970 to 2008. For some coun-
tries there are paucity of data from 1970 in which case we changed the sample
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period from 1980 onward. The time average of the annual growth rate of per
capita income, share of public spending in GDP were constructed for each
country in our sample of 166 countries.
Rate of return on education are not available for all countries in our
sample. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) and Pritchetts (2001) com-
piled rate of return on education series for 48 countries based on Mincer
(1974) type analysis. These series are available on the World Bank web site
(go.worldbank.org/W0WKLRECX0). We could use their rates of return on
schooling data for a sample of 48 countries and for 18 groups in WDI as
shown in Figures 3 and 2 respectively.
A.2 First order conditions
Let t; t;be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the ow budget con-
straint (5), human capital technology (1) respectively.
The Lagrange is:
L =
1P
t=0
tU(ct) +
1P
t=0
t[AG(1   t)kt (lGtht)1  + (1  k)kt   ct   kt+1]
+
1P
t=0
t[(1  h)ht + AHgt (lHtht)1    ht+1]
First order conditions are:
ct : 
tU 0(ct) = t (A.1)
kt+1 :  t + t+1[(1   t+1)yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  k] = 0 (A.2)
ht+1 : t = t+1[1  h + AHgt+1(1  )ht+1 l1 Ht+1] (A.3)
+t+1[AG(1   t+1)(1  )kt+1h t+1l1 Gt+1]
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lGt : t(1  )(1   t)AGl Gt kt h1 t   t(1  )gtAHh1 t l Ht = 0 (A.4)
 t : tyt = tAH
 1
t (htlHt)
1 yt (A.5)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The expression for the optimal tax rate in proposition 1 immediately follows
after substituting out t=t from (A.4) and (A.5). One gets the optimal tax
rate:
 t =
1 
1  :
lHt
lGt
1 + 1 
1  :
lHt
lGt
Next, we exploit the fact that along the balanced growth path, the time
allocations to goods and schooling (lGt and lHt) are constants. Unless the
time allocations are constant, a constant balanced growth rate does not ex-
ist because the marginal product of capital will be time varying (see (A.2)).
Since lGt is a constant, this means that the optimal tax rate  t is also sta-
tionary.
A.4 Derivation of the Balanced Growth Equations
Hereafter, we drop time subscripts for variables which are stationary along
the balanced growth path. To prove (8), use (A.1) and (A.2).
To get (9), rewrite (A.3) as:
t
t
=
t+1
t+1
:
t+1
t
[1  h + AHgt+1(1  )(1  lGt+1)1 ht+1 ] (A.6)
+
t+1
t
fAG(1  )(1   t+1)kt+1h t+1l1 Gt+1g
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Using (A.1), check that t+1
t
= ct
ct+1
: Use (A.5) to substitute out t
t
and also use the balanced growth condition t+1
t
= =(1 + g) which upon
substitution in (A.6) yields:
 = [1  h + AH(1  ) l H (yt=ht)] (A.7)
To get (10) use (1), (2) and (4).
A.5 Derivation of (11) and (12)
Think of human capital as a Lucas (1978) tree with valuation qht which is
akin to Tobins q of physical capital: This valuation is driven by the return
and opportunity cost of going to school. The value of human capital is the
same as the ratio of the shadow price of consumption to that of investment
in schooling. In other words,
qht =
t
t
(A.8)
where t and t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the schooling
technology (1) and the ow resource constraint (see 5).
Using the Euler equation for human capital (see (A.6)), one gets the
following valuation equation for the human capital:
qht = mt+1[fqht+1f1 h+AHgt+1(1 )(1 lGt+1)1 ht+1 g+fAG(1  t+1)(1 )kt+1h t+1l1 Gt+1g]
(A.9)
wheremt+1 is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption
given by t+1=t:
Next verify from (A.4) in the appendix that
qht =
(1   t)MPHGt
MPHEt
(A.10)
where MPHGt and MPH
E
t are the marginal products of e¤ective labour in
the goods and education sectors respectively.
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Rewrite (A.9) as
qht = mt+1

qht+1(1  h + lHt+1MPHEt+1) + lGt+1(1   t+1)MPHGt+1

(A.11)
The valuation equation for human capital looks similar to a Lucas (1978)
tree valuation equation. The value of this tree at date t is the discounted next
period marginal product of human capital in the goods sector, lGt+1MPHGt+1
and the imputed next period value of unused portion of the tree (1  h)qht+1
plus the replenishment of it, lHt+1MPHEt+1 due to new education.
The return to schooling (Rht+1 ) is thus given by:
Rht+1 =

qht+1(1  h + lHt+1MPHEt+1) + lGt+1(1   t+1)MPHGt+1

qht
(A.12)
Along the balanced growth path, qht and  t are stationary. Using (A.10)
one obtains (11).
Using (11) one can rewrite the balanced growth equation (9) as follows:
1 + g = Rh (A.13)
Comparison of (8) with (A.13) one obtains the arbitrage condition (12).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 2 The tax rate that maximizes growth also maximizes the long
run welfare.
Proof. The steady state welfare can be written as:
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Wt =
1X
j=0
j ln ct+j (A.14)
=
ln ct
1   +

(1  )2 ln 
=
ln kt
1   +
ln(ct=kt)
1   +

(1  )2 ln 
Use the resource constraint (5) and the balanced growth condition to
verify that
ct
kt
=
(1  )yt
kt
+ (1  k)   (A.15)
Next plug (8) into (A.15) to nd
ct
kt
=
1  

   (1  )(1  )

(A.16)
which upon substitution in (A.14) yields
Wt =
ln kt
1   + ln(   (1  )) +

(1  )2 ln  + ln

1  


(A.17)
This shows that the steady state welfare is positively related to growth
rate.
Thus the growth maximizer tax rate is also a welfare maximizer.
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